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Credit watch placement and security price behavior around bond 
rating revisions 
Abstract 
This study examines the informational role of credit watch placement in the overall bond rating process from 1992 to 
2006. The paper uses standard event study to examine the market reaction of the whole process of credit rating change 
which includes credit watch placement, transitional period, and actual rating change. The authors find that the act of a 
company’s bond being put on both positive and negative credit watch placements are associated with significant 
abnormal returns in the company’s stock while negative credit watch placement helps reduce the negative market 
reaction on the actual rating downgrade. The paper shows that bond rating revisions associated with initial inclusion on 
credit watch placement are more informative than rating changes that occur without initial inclusion on a credit 
watchlist. Finally, the authors examine the credit rating impact under different level of analyst coverage. The authors 
conclude that low analyst coverage firms which contain low information in the market consistently have larger market 
impacts than high analyst coverage firms. 
Keywords: credit rating agency, credit watch placement, bond rating, abnormal returns. 
JEL Classification: G11, G14, G24. 
 
Introduction 
Credit rating is one of the most important sources of 
information for investors to facilitate future 
creditworthiness of companies. Credit rating reduces 
investors’ costs of gathering, analyzing, and 
monitoring financial positions of borrowers. With 
many rating-dependent regulations implemented by 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), 
National Association of Insurance Commissioners 
(NAIC), and Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC), the use of credit ratings has significantly 
increased over the past three decades. The use of 
ratings and the influence of the opinions of credit 
rating agencies (CRAs) on security markets have 
grown significantly to the extent that ratings are now 
ubiquitous in financial markets and increasingly act as 
benchmarks or creditworthiness standards, far beyond 
their initial purpose. However, critics still cast doubt 
on the importance of the ratings system accusing 
them to be a follower of investor’s opinion. More 
recently, the subprime mortgage crisis in which 
CRA were slow to react to credit deteriorations and 
fail to give investors adequate warning of the risks 
associated with borrowers’ creditworthiness. 
                                                     
 Chiraphol N. Chiyachantana, Eakapat Manitkajornkit, Nareerat 
Taechapiroontong, 2014. 
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In 1992, Moody’s Investors Service (Moody’s) 
initiated an interesting practice as part of a formal 
bond rating process. Prior to an actual rating 
revision, it began putting a credit issue on a 
“watchlist” in order to provide investors with an 
indication of the likely direction and timing of 
future credit rating changes. The underpinnings of a 
corporation’s bond being put on a credit watch is to 
inform investors of the rating agency’s opinion that 
the credit quality of an obligation, or obligor, may 
be changing, thus reducing the company’s stock 
price volatility by moving its credit ratings in a 
gradual, even predictable, fashion in response to 
changes in the fundamental credit quality of the 
credit obligation.  
A significant portion of bond rating changes are 
preceded by credit watch placement. Nonetheless, 
the existing literature that investigates the impact of 
bond rating changes generally investigates the bond 
rating change events as a sole information event in 
the bond rating process. Yet market participants 
often view credit watch placement as a more 
significant credit rating event than the actual bond 
rating revision. For instance, on August 24, 2005, 
following two quarters of losses at North American 
auto operations, Moody’s downgraded Ford Motor 
Company’s senior unsecured credit rating from 
Baa3 (investment grade) to Ba1 (speculative grade). 
Such a downgrade is widely regarded as a significant 
credit rating event, and yet Ford’s share price 
experienced no significant identifiable change on that 
day. However, on June 22, 2005, two months prior to 
the rating downgrade, Moody’s placed Ford on 
negative watch for possible downgrade. That event 
sparked a sell-off in Ford’s shares that resulted in a 
price plunge of more than 5% on that day. 
Consequently, with the typical bond rating change, 
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investors following a firm cannot fully understand 
the overall impact of bond rating revision without 
considering prior credit watch placement.  
In this paper, we extend the existing bond rating 
literature by explicitly linking the event of a credit 
watch placement of a publicly traded corporation’s 
bond to the event of an actual rating change, in an 
effort to improve our understanding of how the 
overall process of bond rating revisions affect 
financial markets. Specifically, we investigate the 
importance of bond rating revision by examining 
how markets react to bond rating events which 
include credit watch placement, bond rating change 
and transitional period between two events. Prior 
literature that investigates the impact of bond rating 
revision focuses on the event of bond rating change. 
Our study differs to the prior literature in that we 
examine the overall process of bond rating revision 
in order to understand how investors respond to the 
credit watch placement, during the transitional 
period and the market reaction at the actual bond 
rating change.  
Using a comprehensive database of Moody’s credit 
watch placement and the subsequent bond rating 
change over a 15-year period from October 1992 to 
December 2006, we perform an event study of 
putting a publicly traded company’s credit issue on 
a watchlist by the CRA. Our working hypothesis is 
that we should observe a significantly larger total 
market impact in credit rating change preceded by 
credit watch placement in comparison to credit 
rating change without credit watch placement. At 
the same time, the market response during the actual 
rating change should be less due to the prior 
warning of credit watch placement.  
The empirical examination of this study is built on 
two distinct levels. The first level relates to 
conclusions that emerge directly from the 
characteristics and market reaction associated with a 
company’s bond being placed on credit watch. The 
second level examines the relationship of analyst 
coverage and the bond rating changes. Our finding 
emphasizes the importance of incorporating credit 
watch placement in the study of bond rating 
changes. Credit watch is used extensively as a signal 
of a future rating revision: Approximately 49.6% 
(30.8%) of bond downgrades (upgrades) are 
associated with prior credit watch placement. More 
importantly, in regards to a publicly traded 
corporation’s bond, being placed on a watchlist 
appears to contain more information than the bond 
rating change itself. Specifically, we find that the 
market response to being placed on a negative 
(positive) credit watch is associated with an average 
cumulative abnormal return (CAR) in the 
company’s stock of -2.88% (1.31%) over a three-
day period centered on the watchlist inclusion event, 
compare with an abnormal equity return of -1.62% 
(0.09%) associated with the actual bond rating 
downgrade (upgrade) event.  
Having found evidence of a significant market 
reaction with credit watch placement, we examine 
how credit watch placement affects the information 
content of bond rating revision by explicitly linking 
the event of a credit watch placement to the event of 
a rating revision. We find that negative credit watch 
placement reduces the company’s stock price 
volatility at actual bond rating downgrade. 
Specifically, the market response of -3.14% at the 
rating downgrade event without prior credit watch 
drops to -1.62% when preceded by credit watch 
placement. However, the positive watch placement 
does not reduce much market reaction because the 
market reaction of rating upgrade is already very 
small due to the fact that most good news have been 
voluntarily released to the public.  
In the second level, we examine the relationship 
between bond rating change and analyst coverage. 
We conjecture that the informativeness of credit 
watch placement varies across firms depending on 
the degree of a firm’s analyst coverage. If credit 
watch placement helps resolve uncertainty about 
future rating revision, then the effects should be 
most pronounced in the firms whose information is 
difficult to acquire by investors. Our findings 
indicate that low analyst coverage firms which 
contain low information in the market consistently 
have larger market impacts than high analyst 
coverage firms. Finally, our findings from cross-
sectional multivariate regressions reinforce the 
informational effect of credit watch placements. 
Inclusion on a negative watch list has an 
economically and statistically significant impact on 
abnormal returns around bond downgrade and the 
information effects of credit watch are most 
pronounced in low analyst coverage firms.  
Our study offers several substantial contributions to 
the existing literature. First, unlike prior literature, 
we focus on the entire process of the bond rating 
revision, including placement on a credit watchlist 
as well as the subsequent rating change. The 
existing literature that focuses on market reactions 
at bond rating change does not make it possible to 
fully understand whether credit ratings play an 
important economic role and whether, at its core, 
ratings changes are informative. Inclusion of the 
credit watch list event is critical in clearly assessing 
the role of credit rating agencies in generating 
fundamental credit quality of the credit obligation. 
Second, we formulate an event study methodology 
by utilizing the information inherent in credit watch 
resolutions to accurately link credit watch placements 
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to subsequent bond rating changes. This complete 
picture afforded by our data set allows us to 
investigate the overall impact of bond rating 
announcements while overcoming the limitations in 
prior research. Lastly, we are the first to investigate 
the relationship between the analyst coverage and 
the stock price impact of bond rating changes during 
all phases of bond rating change.  
The paper is organized as follows. The next section 
discusses literature review. Section 2 introduces 
credit rating process and credit watch placement. 
Section 3 describes data and methodology. Section 4 
discusses the empirical results and section 5 
provides multivariate regression. The final section 
presents our conclusions. 
1. Literature review 
Two sets of results are prominent. First the results 
support capital market efficiency. The efficient 
market hypothesis argues that rating agencies 
evaluate the default risk of bond issuers based only 
on publicly available information that, in efficient 
market, is impounded in security prices as soon as it 
is available. Therefore, the ratings announcement 
contains little information and no significant market 
reaction during the rating change. Kaplan and 
Urwitz (1977) support this hypothesis and show that 
it is relatively easy to predict rating on the basis of 
publicly available information. Ederington and 
Yawitz (1987) find that most ratings can be 
predicted from publicly available information. In 
addition, several studies have concluded that bond 
and stock prices adjust before, not after the rating 
change is announced. For example, Hettenhouse and 
Sartoris (1976) examine the information content for 
public utility bonds as evidenced in bond prices. They 
conclude that when bonds are downgraded, price 
adjustments are made before the announcement date, 
but the same is not true for bond rating increases. 
Weinstein (1977) uses monthly prices from the 
exchange market along with estimates of price in a 
study of 132 rating changes from 1962 through 1974. 
He finds marginal evidence of a price reaction in the 
period from 18 months to 6 months before the rating 
change and no evidence of abnormal returns in the 
period from 6 months before to 6 months after the 
event. Pinches and Singleton (1978) examine 
common stock price reactions to bond rating changes 
and find abnormal returns before the announcement 
of both bond rating upgrades and downgrades, and 
only normal returns following the rating change. 
Thus, they believe that the information content of 
bond rating changes is very limited for the associated 
stock returns. They further conclude that stock 
markets are leading bond markets in terms of 
information processing efficiency. 
Second, a competing theory is the private 
information analysis which argues that rating 
agencies may possess private information about the 
issuing firm. Belkaoui (1983) and Sherwood (1976) 
support this hypothesis and claim that rating 
agencies do receive a considerable quantity of 
sensitive information, including projections and 
plans, which are held in strict confidence. Many 
other studies indicate that markets do react to credit 
rating changes and are informative. Katz (1974) 
studies the credit rating for electric utility 
companies from the 1966-1972 periods. They find 
little, if any, anticipation of the rating change for 
electric utility bonds, and report an adjustment lag 
up to 10 weeks following rating change. Grier and 
Katz (1976) examine the information content of 
bond rating decreases as evidenced in bond prices. 
They conclude that there is anticipation of a bond 
rating decrease in the industrial bond market, but no 
anticipation in the public utility bond market. 
Griffin and Sanvicente (1982) examine the 
adjustments in a firm’s common stock price during 
eleven months before and during the month of 
announcement of bond rating change. Use three 
approaches for measuring abnormal security price 
adjustments: one factor market model, two-factor 
cross-sectional model, and control portfolio, they 
report that for downgrade, the significant abnormal 
returns are observed for both eleven months before 
and the month of announcement. For upgrade, the 
price adjustments are statistically insignificant in the 
month of announcement, although, in the preceding 
eleven months, upgraded firms experience positive 
abnormal returns. Kliger and Sarig (2000) examine 
the security-price reactions to rating information by 
evaluating abnormal returns during rating changes 
events that occur when Moody’s refines its rating 
reports. Their results suggest that rating information 
is valuable as both prices of bonds and stocks of 
fine-rated firms produce abnormal returns, although 
their total-firm values appear unaffected. 
There is substantial evidence of asymmetric 
information content between credit rating upgrade 
and downgrade. For example, Holthausen and 
Leftwich (1986), Hand, Holthausen and Leftwich 
(1992), Dichev and Piotroski (2001) and Griffin and 
Sanvicente (1982) find that downgrades have 
significant impact on stock or bond prices, but 
upgrades do not seem to have much effect. Goh and 
Ederington (1998) provide a plausible explanation that 
firms voluntarily release good news to the market prior 
to a rating announcement. Prior literature also 
documents evidence that managers tend to withhold 
bad news while voluntarily release good news. For 
example, Verrechia (2001) and Hermalin and 
Weisbach (2007) show that optimal disclosure is less 
than fully transparent, especially with respect to bad 
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news. Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal (2005) conduct a 
survey in which some CFOs delayed bad news 
disclosures in hope that they may never have to release 
bad news if the firm’s status improves before the 
required information is released. Career concern can 
motivate managers to withhold bad news and gamble 
that subsequent corporate events will allow them to 
bury it. Kothari, Shu and Wysocki (2008) find that 
management, on average, delays the release of bad 
news to investors. This willingness to release good 
news to the public increases the quantity of 
information in the market and should subsequently 
reduce information content of bond rating upgrades.  
2. Bond rating process, credit watch placement 
and watchlist duration  
2.1. Bond rating process. Moody’s credit ratings 
have been used since 1919. Moody’s assigns credit 
ratings for issuers of certain types of debt 
obligations. Ratings are opinions of future relative 
creditworthiness and the ability to pay back a loan, 
derived by fundamental credit analysis and expressed 
through the familiar Aaa to C symbol system. 
Moody’s credit analysis focuses on the fundamental 
factors and key business drivers relevant to an issuer’s 
risk profile. In the course of the rating process, a 
Moody’s analyst gathers information to evaluate risk 
to investors who might own or buy a given security, 
and the appropriate rating is developed in a committee. 
The analyst then monitors the security on an ongoing 
basis to determine whether the rating remains 
appropriate. If the analyst sees signs that indicate a 
rating change, Moody’s may alter the rating and 
inform the marketplace of the change. The rating 
process involves an active, ongoing dialogue between 
the issuer and Moody’s analysts. Once published, 
Moody’s ratings are continuously monitored and 
updated through dialogues and regular meetings, 
during which issuers are encouraged to raise any 
concern and present all pertinent materials. 
2.2. Credit watch placements. In 1992, Moody’s 
began placing certain bonds on a watchlist to 
indicate the likely direction and timing of future 
credit rating changes. If changing circumstances 
cause contradictions in the assumptions or data that 
support the current rating, Moody’s may place the 
rating under review (i.e. on the watchlist). 
According to Moody’s (1998, 2002), rating reviews 
are formal rating actions and, like all Moody’s 
rating actions, the decision to place an issue on the 
watchlist is made by a rating committee. The rating 
review has a well defined beginning and end. The 
watchlist’s objective is to reduce volatility and 
increase the stability of the rating process. The 
watchlist highlights issuers whose rating is formally 
on review for possible upgrade, downgrade, or 
direction uncertain. A formal rating committee is 
normally required to place an issuer on the 
watchlist, and a separate rating committee is needed 
to take the issuer off the watchlist. In most cases, 
members of the rating committee will meet with a 
firm’s management after it is placed on the 
watchlist. The information gained at this meeting 
can form the basis for the confirmation of the rating 
or a rating change. Typically, the rating is placed on 
the watchlist within 90 days and rating agencies 
change or confirm the current rating depending on 
whether the risks and expected loss are still 
consistent with the assigned rating. Although the 
watchlist is not a guarantee or commitment to 
change ratings over a certain time horizon í or even 
to change them at all í historically, between 66% 
and 76% of all ratings have been changed in the 
same direction (and rarely in the opposite direction) 
as indicated by their watchlist review. 
2.3. Watchlist durations. An important component 
of the rating environment associated with the 
watchlist is the length of time that ratings remain on 
credit watch placement before the review is resolved. 
We refer to this period as watchlist duration. The 
median duration of a rating review is 91 days, while 
the mean is 108 days. There is some variation in 
duration with respect to the initial watchlist placement 
direction. Ratings placed on review for downgrade 
have the shortest duration with a median of 85 days 
and an average 103 days, followed by ratings placed 
on review for upgrade at 93 and 115 days for the 
median and average respectively.  
3. Data and methodology 
3.1. Data. We use two databases in the current 
study: Moody’s Default Risk Service data and daily 
stock price from Center for Research in Security 
Prices (CRSP). We have used a large sample of 
credit watch placements and bond rating changes 
from October 1, 1992 to December 31, 2006, from 
the Moody’s Default Risk Service database. A credit 
watch placement is placed to provide indications of 
the likely direction and timing of future credit rating 
changes. The database provides information on the 
beginning and the ending date of a credit watch 
placement, as well as its subsequent rating change. 
A credit watch is designated either “positive” 
(possible upgrade), “negative” (possible downgrade) 
or “developing” (uncertain direction, insufficient 
available information or this is to be currently 
assessed). We exclude developing credit watch from 
our sample because the observations are very small 
and it is not a clear signal about the credit rating’s 
future direction1. We also confine the sample to US 
domestic taxable corporate bonds, excluding bonds 
issued via private placement and Yankee bonds. 
                                                     
1 There are 34 developing credit watches with 14 watches resulting in 
rating upgrades and 20 watches resulting in rating downgrades. 
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To maintain the integrity of the dataset and remove 
potentially contaminating errors, we apply the 
following five filters to the dataset of credit watch 
placements and changes in bond ratings. First, each 
bond rating change and credit watch announcement 
constitute one observation (linked sample). Second, 
Moody’s case of issuing interim credit watches, we 
consider only the first credit watch that leads to a 
subsequent rating change because watches in the 
interim are likely to be uninformative1. Third, if a 
rating change and a credit watch relate to multiple 
bonds issued by the same issuer, we consider only 
the issue with the largest magnitude of a rating 
change and subsequent rating changes for credit 
watch. Fourth, we exclude from our analysis credit 
watch placements and bond rating changes 
associated with other news announcements. We 
manually search for news stories in the Wall Street 
Journal for potential contaminated events within 
three days before and after a credit watch placement 
and bond rating change announcement. Lastly, we 
exclude firms that have been removed from 
NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ within one year after a 
bond rating change.  
Panel A of Table 1 reports the summary statistics of 
the number of credit rating changes from October 
1992 to December 2006. In our sample, there are 
816 bond downgrades preceded by negative watch 
placements (linked downgrades), 830 bond down-
grades without negative watch placements (surprise 
downgrades), 360 bond upgrades preceded by 
positive watch placements (linked upgrades), and 
809 bond upgrades without positive watch 
placements (surprise upgrades). Credit watch is 
used extensively by Moody’s as a signal to warn 
investors prior to an actual rating change. Linked 
downgrades (upgrades) are 49.6% (30.8%) of total 
downgrades (upgrades). Such high percentages of 
prior credit watch in both upgrades and downgrades 
confirm the importance of this study. Furthermore, 
there is almost double number of downgrades than 
upgrades because CRAs could expend more resources 
in detecting a deterioration in credit quality rather than 
reporting just on the improvements in credit quality. 
Panel B of Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for 
each type of credit rating changes. The age of the 
sample in linked sample is typically older than that 
of the surprise sample. Linked downgrade (upgrade) 
has average age of 353.55 (317.64) months while 
surprise downgrade (upgrade) has average age of 
244.13 (250.42) months. For analyst coverage, 
following the expectation that analyst follows credit 
rating upgrade more than downgrade. Analyst 
coverage for linked (surprise) upgrade is 14.35 (11.55) 
analysts. The analyst coverage for linked (surprise) 
downgrade is 10.95 (9.21) analysts. The size of 
rating upgrade firms appear to be higher than that of 
rating downgrade firms. Lastly, the magnitude of 
rating change does not differ much across linked 
and surprise for downgrades and upgrades.  
Table 1. Descriptive statistics1 
Panel A presents the number of linked and surprised credit rating changes by calendar year. Panel B shows sample characteristics by 
each rating changes. Linked credit rating change is credit rating change with prior credit watch placement. Surprised credit rating 
change is credit rating change without prior credit watch placement. Agemonth is the number of months since the firm was first 
covered by CRSP. Value is the market capitalization at the bond rating change date. Analyst coverage is the number of analysts 
following the company in the sample. Rat_Chg is the absolute magnitude of the rating change, where categorical bond ratings are 
converted into a cardinal variable measured on a 23-point scale (1 = AAA, 23 = D). Data on Moody’s credit rating is obtained from 
Moody’s Corporate Default Risk Service database. The analysis covers time period from October 1992 to December 2006.  
Panel A. Bond rating change by calendar year
Year Number of linked downgrade Number of surprise downgrade Number of linked upgrade Number of surprise upgrade
1992 17 13 7 11
1993 36 28 33 42
1994 37 33 25 53
1995 33 48 29 45
1996 46 44 33 68
1997 33 55 13 64
1998 41 71 20 59
1999 52 63 24 55
2000 78 71 13 33
2001 98 109 15 66
2002 111 64 11 26
2003 72 46 25 31
2004 42 41 31 53
                                                     
1 An Interim credit watch occurs when Moody’s issues a new watch on the watch end date and issues a temporary confirmation of the existing credit 
rating while acknowledging that the uncertainties around the initial placement on the watch list remain unresolved. For robustness, we repeat all 
analyses including these observations. The overall results are qualitatively similar. 
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Table 1 (cont.). Descriptive statistics 
Panel A. Bond rating change by calendar year 
Year Number of linked downgrade Number of surprise downgrade Number of linked upgrade Number of surprise upgrade
2005 47 45 36 52
2006 73 99 45 151
Total 816 830 360 809
Panel B. Sample characteristics by each rating changes 
Agemonth Analyst_cov Value Rat_chg
Linked downgrade 353.55 10.95 4487347 1.37
Surprise downgrade 244.13 9.21 7765694 1.26
Linked upgrade 317.64 14.35 10656557 1.32
Surprise upgrade 250.42 11.55 7248026 1.13
 
3.2. Methodology. We examine market responses 
for the event windows of the credit watch 
placement, transitional period, and bond rating 
change using standard event study methodology. 
Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are 
calculated over a 3-day event window (-1, +1) 
centered on both the day of credit watch 
placement and credit rating change. The 
transitional period begins after credit watch 
placement (+2CW) and ends before the bond 
rating change event period (-2RC). The full 
timeline is shown in the diagram below. 
 
The returns are calculated as follow: 
( )( ) 1,
( )
p tr t
p t
§ · ¨ ¸c© ¹  
where r(t) is the return on purchase at t’, sale at t; 
p(t) is the last sale price or closing bid/ask average 
at time t; p(t’) is the last sale price or closing bid/ask 
average at time of last available price < t. 
Excess, or abnormal, stock returns are computed as 
the difference between the daily raw stock return 
and the concurrent value weighted NYSE/ 
AMEX/NASDAQ index return.  
AR(t) = r(t) – e(t), 
where AR(t) is the abnormal return; e(t) is the 
concurrent value weighted NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ 
index return. 
4. Empirical results 
4.1. Information content of credit watch placement 
and bond rating changes. We examine market 
responses for the whole process of credit rating 
change which includes credit watch placement, the 
transitional period, and bond rating change. We are 
interested in three aspects. First, we examine whether 
credit watch placements are informative and convey 
information to the market. Second, we compare the 
market responses of linked and surprise rating 
changes. Lastly, we compare the total impact of linked 
and surprise rating change. We expect linked rating 
change to have larger total impact due to larger 
information content of credit rating revision. 
Panel A of Table 2 reports CARs for credit watch 
placement (-1CW, +1CW), transitional period 
(+2CW, -2RC), and bond rating changes (-1RC, 
+1RC) for rating downgrades. Rating downgrades are 
categorized into linked and surprise downgrade. From 
the table, the first row is the linked event, the second 
row is the surprise event and the last row is CARs 
difference of linked and surprise rating change. 
Table 2. Moody’s cumulative abnormal returns  
for rating changes 
This table reports cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for 
linked and surprise rating changes for event window of credit 
watch placement (-1 to 1, where day 0 denotes the day of the 
credit watch placements), during the interim, or transitional 
period and event window of bond rating changes (-1 to 1, where 
day 0 denotes the day of the bond rating changes). Panel A is 
for downgrade while panel B is for upgrade. CAR is defined as 
stock return minus the contemporaneous return on the value-
weighted market portfolio. Linked rating change is rating 
change that is preceded by credit watch placement. Surprise 
rating change is the rating change without prior credit watch 
placement. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels. t-statistics are reported in the parentheses. 
Panel A. Negative watch and bond downgrade 
 Cumulative abnormal returns 
Obs Credit watch Transitional Rating change
Linked event 816 -2.88%*** (-6.40) 
-0.73% 
(-0.77) 
-1.62%***
(-3.49) 
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Table 2 (cont.). Moody’s cumulative abnormal 
returns for rating changes 
Panel A. Negative watch and bond downgrade 
Cumulative abnormal returns 
Obs Obs Obs Obs
Surprise event 830   -3.14%***(-6.93)
Difference    -1.52%**(-2.34)
Panel B. Positive watch and bond upgrade 
 Cumulative abnormal returns 
Obs Credit watch Transitional Rating change
Linked event 360 1.31%***(4.12)
1.55%** 
(2.20) 
0.09%
(0.19)
Surprise event 809   0.10%(0.62)
Difference    0.01%(0.04)
If credit watch placement is informative and 
conveys new information to the market, we should 
observe a significant stock-price reaction during the 
event window around credit watch placement. We 
find that CARs for the negative credit watch 
placement of -2.88% is economically and statistically 
significant. The evidence confirms the informativeness 
of credit watch placement which provides essential 
information to market participants. During the 
transitional period of a downgrade event, we 
conjecture that there should be no market reaction 
because no information is delivered to the market 
due to the unwillingness to disclose more bad news 
by the company. Following our expectation, the 
market reaction of the transitional period for 
downgrade is -0.73% which is small and not 
statistically significant. 
Next, to determine whether the inclusion of credit 
watch reduces the uncertainty surrounding rating 
change, we examine the market reaction around the 
actual bond rating change conditional on a prior 
credit watch placement. The rationale of a credit 
watch placement is to inform investors of the rating 
agency’s opinion that the credit quality of an 
obligation may be changing, thereby aiming to 
reduce the company’s stock price volatility by 
moving its credit ratings in a gradual, even 
predictable, fashion. Hence, if being put on credit 
watch serves its purpose of informing market 
participants of an upcoming rating change, and helps 
reduce the stock market’s reaction to the actual 
information content underlying the forthcoming 
rating revision, we should expect to see a smaller 
market reaction surrounding the event of an actual 
bond rating change following a credit watch 
placement relative to a surprise bond rating change. 
Consistent with our expectation, the announcement 
period returns are larger for surprise bond rating 
 
changes. The abnormal stock returns for surprise 
bond downgrade are -3.14% relative to -1.62% for 
linked rating changes. Our findings suggest that 
being put on a credit watch appears to have the 
effect of attenuating market impact associated with 
the corresponding stocks in the event of an actual 
bond rating change itself. 
Panel B of Table 2 reports CARs for upgrade 
events. Results also confirm the importance of 
positive credit watch placement. We find that CARs 
around the positive credit watch placement of 1.31% 
is economically and statistically significant. During 
the transitional period, we expect significant market 
reaction due to the willingness to disclose good 
news by the company. The market reaction during 
the transitional period for upgrade is 1.55% which is 
large and statistically significant. Lastly, we expect 
that all good news information has likely been 
released to the public before the actual rating 
upgrade. Thus, the market responses to the linked and 
surprise upgrades should be small. Our results support 
our expectation. The market reactions are 0.09% and 
0.10% for the linked and surprise upgrades respecti-
vely with the difference of only 0.01%. 
Lastly, our approach for analyzing the total impact 
of bond rating changes considers all events which 
include credit watch placement, transitional period 
and actual rating change. We compare the overall 
impact of credit rating actions of linked events to 
the surprise events. Table 3 reports overall CARs of 
-5.23% (2.95%) for linked downgrade (upgrade), and 
CARs of only -3.14% (0.10%) for surprise downgrade 
(upgrade). The CARs difference between linked and 
surprise downgrade (upgrade) is -2.09% (2.85%) 
which is statistically significant 1% level. Our findings 
suggest that longer time frames for linked events 
help investors assimilate greater information. 
Table 3. Overall impact of rating change 
This table reports overall cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) 
for linked and surprise sample which covers credit watch 
placement, transitional period and rating changes. CAR is 
defined as stock return minus the contemporaneous return on 
the value-weighted market portfolio. The first two columns are 
linked and surprise event. The last column is the difference 
between linked and surprise event. Linked event is rating 
change that is preceded by credit watch placement. Surprise 
rating change is the rating change without prior credit watch 
placement. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels. t-statistics are reported in the parentheses. 
Overall impact of rating change
Linked event Surprise event Difference
Downgrade -5.23%***(-5.02) 
-3.14%*** 
(-6.93) 
-2.09%***
(-3.69) 
Upgrade 2.95%***(3.69) 
0.10% 
(0.62) 
2.85%***
(4.85) 
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4.2. Credit watch placements and analyst coverage. 
This section examines the relationship between analyst 
coverage and credit watch placement. We 
examine the extent to which the impact of credit 
watch placement varies according to the number 
of analysts following the company. We sort 
sample stocks into three equally weighted 
portfolios (high, medium, and low) using the 
number of analysts following the company. 
Analysts provide guidance of company’s 
fundamental status to the investors. There is 
evidence that news in analyst forecasts impact 
credit ratings (Ederington and Goh, 1998). More 
analyst following means that more information 
available in the market. Hsueh and Liu (1992) 
report empirical evidence showing that the effect 
of bond rating change announcements varies across 
firms and over time, depending on the quantity of 
information available at the time of announcements. 
Hence, high availability of information in the 
market leads to lower informational impact provided 
by CRA’s announcement.  
Table 4 presents the CARs for credit watch placement 
(-1CW, +1CW), transitional period (+2CW, -2RC), 
and bond rating change (-1RC, +1RC) for high and 
low analyst coverage portfolios. Panel A shows low 
analyst coverage firms which contain low information 
in the market consistently have larger market impacts 
than high analyst coverage firms. The event-period 
CARs of -4.00%, -2.36%, -3.18% and -4.73% for 
credit watch placement, transitional period, rating 
change of linked downgrades, and rating change of 
surprise downgrades, respectively in low analyst 
coverage firms are greater than -2.84%, -0.35%,  
-1.01%, and -1.37%, respectively in high analyst 
coverage firms. The difference between high and low 
is statistically significant at rating change of linked and 
surprise downgrade. However, the rating upgrade of 
panel B shows mixed result. The difference of rating 
change of linked upgrade is positively significant 
while the difference of surprise upgrade is negatively 
significant. The difference results between upgrade 
and downgrade are consistent with prior research that 
there is asymmetric information between rating 
upgrades and downgrades.  
Table 4. Cumulative abnormal returns by analyst coverage 
This table reports cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) sorted into three equally weighted portfolios (high, medium, and low) by 
analyst coverage for linked sample of credit watch placements and bond rating changes for event window of credit watch placement 
(-1 to 1, where day 0 denotes the day of the credit watch placements), and event window of bond rating changes (-1 to 1, where day 
0 denotes the day of the bond rating changes). Panel A reports downgrade event and panel B reports upgrade event. CAR is defined 
as stock return minus the contemporaneous return on the value-weighted market portfolio. Analyst coverage is the number of 
analysts following the company in the sample. CW is credit watch placement. TR is transitional period. RC is bond rating change. 
The sample period is from October 1992 to December 2006. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. t-statistics are reported in the parentheses. 
Panel A. Rating downgrades 
 Obs. Linked downgrade 
Obs. Surprise downgrade 
CW TR RC 
L 268 -4.00%*** (-4.43) 
-2.36% 
(-1.29) 
-3.18%*** 
(-3.41) 257 
-4.73%*** 
(-4.67) 
H 301 -2.84%*** (-3.88) 
-0.35% 
(-0.29) 
-1.01% 
(-1.25) 299 
-1.37%*** 
(-2.84) 
L-H -1.16% (-1.01) 
-2.01% 
(-0.93) 
-2.17%* 
(-1.76) 
-3.36%*** 
(-3.14) 
Panel B. Rating upgrades 
 Obs. 
Linked upgrade
Obs. Surprise upgrade 
CW TR RC 
L 107 1.63%*** (2.48) 
2.81%*** 
(2.41) 
0.44% 
(1.22) 266 
-0.56% 
(-1.61) 
H 120 1.45%*** (2.72) 
2.26% 
(1.63) 
-0.58% 
(-1.64) 285 
0.36% 
(1.49) 
L-H 0.18% (0.21) 
0.55% 
(0.30) 
1.02%** 
(2.02) 
-0.92%** 
(-2.20) 
 
Table 5 reports overall market impact for high and 
low analyst coverage. The empirical result on rating 
downgrade for both linked and surprise events show 
significant difference in overall impact. The 
difference of overall market impact between linked 
and surprise downgrade (upgrade) are large and 
significant for both high and low analyst coverage. 
The result shows that credit watch placement helps 
to convey larger information in both environment of 
high and low information availability in the market.   
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Table 5. Overall impact of rating change by analyst coverage 
This table reports overall cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) sorted into three equally weighted portfolios (high, medium, and 
low) by analyst coverage. CAR is defined as stock return minus the contemporaneous return on the value-weighted market portfolio. 
Analyst coverage is the number of analysts following the company in the sample. Linked event is rating change that is preceded by 
credit watch placement. Surprise rating change is the rating change without prior credit watch placement.  The sample period is from 
October 1992 to December 2006. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. t-statistics are 
reported in the parentheses. 
Overall impact of rating change 
Linked event Surprise event Difference
Downgrade 
L -9.54%***(-4.58) 
-4.73%***
(-4.67) 
-4.81%**
(-2.04) 
H -4.20%***(-2.79) 
-1.37%***
(-2.84) 
-2.83%*
-(1.79) 
L-H -5.34%**(-2.10) 
-3.36%***
(-3.14)  
Upgrade 
L 4.88%***(3.33) 
-0.56%
(-1.61) 
5.44%***
(5.04) 
H 3.13%**(2.10) 
0.36%
(1.49) 
2.77%***
(2.68) 
L-H 1.75%(0.83) 
-0.92%**
(-2.20)  
 
5. Cross-sectional multivariate regressions 
To investigate the cross-sectional variation in the 
effect of credit watch placements on abnormal 
returns around bond downgrade, we employ 
multivariate regressions and estimate regressions in 
the following form: 
0 1 2
3 4 5 .
i i i
i i i i
CAR WATCH ANALYST
CROSS RCHANGE REGFD
   
   
D D D
D D D H  
The dependent variables are CARs of the total rating 
downgrade period (-1CW, +1RC). WATCH is a 
credit watch dummy variable that equals 1 if the 
rating change is preceded by credit watch 
placement, and zero otherwise; ANALYST is the 
number of analysts following the company; CROSS is 
a dummy variable that equals 1 if a bond is revised 
from investment grade to speculative grade or vice 
versa, and zero otherwise; RCHANGE is the absolute 
magnitude of the rating change, where categorical 
bond ratings are converted into a cardinal variable 
measured on a 23-point scale (1 = AAA, 23 = D); 
REGFD is a regulation fair disclosure dummy variable 
that equals 1 if an observation is from the post-fair 
disclosure period, and zero otherwise.  
CARs around rating downgrade (upgrade) period. 
The variable of interest is the coefficient of WATCH 
and ANALYST, which gauges the informational total 
impact of credit watch placement and analyst 
coverage respectively. If credit watch placement 
provides more complete information to investors, 
we expect the coefficient of WATCH to be negative 
(positive). Regarding ANALYST, Hsueh and Liu 
(1992) report empirical evidence showing that the 
effect of bond rating change announcements varies 
across firms and over time, depending on the 
quantity of information available at the time of 
announcements. More analyst coverage means more 
information in the market so we expect the sign of 
the coefficient to be positive (negative). Existing 
research shows that RCHANGE is a key 
determinant of the stock price impact around rating 
changes. Greater RCHANGE should result in more 
negative (positive) informational impact so we 
expect the coefficient on RCHANGE to be negative 
(positive). Jorion, Liu and Shi (2005) examine 
REGFD and find that the rating becomes more 
informative after the implementation of the 
Regulation Fair Disclosure. Hence, we expect the 
coefficients on REGFD to be negative (positive). 
Finally, the variable CROSS controls for the 
possibility that across-class rating revisions that 
shift a bond into or out of investment grade are 
associated with larger market reactions. We 
therefore expect a negative (positive) sign on 
CROSS for rating downgrades (upgrades).  
Table 6 reports the multivariate regression analysis. 
The coefficient on WATCH for downgrade 
regression is -2.544 and significant at five percent 
level, suggesting that credit watch placement helps 
to increase the total informational impact at the rating 
downgrade. The significantly positive coefficient on 
ANALYST is consistent with the argument that more 
analyst coverage will result in weaker informational 
effect on stock prices. The coefficient of CROSS, 
which measures the effect of downgrade from 
investment grade to speculative grade is positive and 
significant. Similarly, the coefficient on RCHANGE 
implies the marginal effect of rating downgrade in 
rating of one grade (e.g. from BB to BB+) on 
abnormal stock returns is -3.755. Lastly, the 
significant positive of REGFD suggests that the 
average stock reaction to bond downgrading news is 
significantly stronger after FD then before FD. 
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Table 6. Multivariate regression for rating changes 
This tables report the regression analysis for the effects of credit watch placement on overall stock price reaction.  
0 1 2 3 4 5 .i i i i i i iCAR WATCH ANALYST CROSS RCHANGE REGFD      D D D D D D H  
CAR is cumulative abnormal return. WATCH is credit watch dummy variable that equals 1 if rating change is preceded by credit 
watch placement and zero otherwise; ANALYST is the number of analysts following the company; CROSS is a dummy variable that 
equals 1 if a bond is revised from investment grade to speculative grade or vice versa, and zero otherwise; RCHANGE is the 
absolute magnitude of the rating change, where categorical bond ratings are converted into a cardinal variable measured on a 23-
point scale (1 = AAA, 23 = D); REGFD is a regulation fair disclosure dummy variable that equals 1 if an observation is from the 
post-fair disclosure period, and zero otherwise. The sample period is from October 1992 to December 2006. 
Market reaction including transition and credit watch period 
Downgrade Upgrade 
Coefficients t-stat Coefficients t-stat 
Intercept -1.778 -1.14 -0.41 (-0.56)
WATCH -2.544** -2.22 2.687*** (4.42)
ANALYST 0.209*** 3.13 -0.009 (-0.28)
CROSS 4.339** 2.2 0.685 (0.75)
RCHANGE -3.755*** -5.86 0.43 (1.24)
REGFD 3.535*** 3.09 0.119 (0.22)
Adjusted R2 (%) 3.37 1.78
F-stat 12.48*** 5.25*** 
No. of obs. 1645 1168
 
For the upgrades, the coefficients of WATCH is 
+2.687, suggesting that credit watch placement has an 
economically and statistically significant impact on the 
information content of rating changes. The other 
control variables are all insignificant. This is consistent 
to prior studies (e.g. Jorion, Liu and Shi, 2005) that 
generally find less stock market reaction to upgrades.  
Conclusion 
In this paper, we examine the informational impact of 
credit watch placement on common stock prices. We 
examine the whole process of rating change starting 
from credit watch placement, transitional period and 
 
actual rating change. There is strong evidence that the 
act of being put on a credit watchlist is in itself an 
informative event. It conveys new information as well 
as provides longer time for investors to assimilate 
more complete information. The asymmetric market 
reaction between rating upgrade and downgrade is 
significant mainly during the actual credit rating 
change where rating downgrade has significant impact 
on stock or bond price, but upgrades do not have much 
effect. Moreover, our findings indicate that low analyst 
coverage firms which contain low information in the 
market consistently have larger market impacts than 
high analyst coverage firms.   
References 
1. Akhigbe, A., Madura, J., and Whyte, A.M. (1997). Intra-industry Effects of Bond Rating Adjustment, Journal of 
Financial Research, 20, pp. 545-561.  
2. Belkaoui, A. (1983). Industrial Bonds and the Rating Process, Quarum Book. 
3. Brown, S.J. and Warner, J.B. (1984). Using Daily Stock Returns the Case of Event Studies, Journal of Financial 
Economics, 14, pp. 3-31. 
4. Dichev, I.D., and Piotroski, J.D. (2001). The Long-run Stock Returns Following Bond Ratings Changes, The 
Journal of Finance, 56, pp. 173-203.  
5. Ederington, L.H., and Goh, J.C. (1998). Bond Rating Agencies and Stock Analysts: Who Knows What When? 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 33, pp. 569-585. 
6. Ederington, L.H. and Yawitz, J. (1987). The Bond Rating Process. In Edward Altman (ed.), Handbook of 
Financial Markets, New York: John Wiley and Sons. 
7. Glascock, J.L., Davidson, W.N., and Henderson, G.V. (1987). Announcement Effects of Moody’s Bond Ratings 
Changes on Equity Returns, Quarterly Journal of Business and Economics, 26, pp. 67-78.  
8. Goh, J.C., and Ederington, L.H. (1993). Is a Bond Rating Downgrade Bad News, Good News, or No News for 
Stockholders? The Journal of Finance, 48, pp. 2001-2008.  
9. Graham, J.R., Harvey, C.R., and Rajgopal, S. (2005). The Economic Implications of Corporate Financial 
Reporting, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 40, pp. 3-73.  
10. Grier, P., and Katz, S. (1976). The Differential Effects of Bond Rating Changes Among Industrial and Public 
Utility Bonds by Maturity, The Journal of Business, 49, pp. 226-239.  
11. Griffin, P.A., and Sanvicente, A.Z. (1982). Common Stock Returns and Rating Changes: A Methological 
Comparison, The Journal of Finance, 37, pp. 103-119. 
Investment Management and Financial Innovations, Volume 11, Issue 1, 2014 
28 
12. Hand, J., Holthausen, R., and Leftwich R.W. (1992). The Effect of Bond Rating Agency Announcements on Bond 
and Stock Prices, The Journal of Finance, 47, pp. 733-752. 
13. Hermalin, B.E., and Weisbach, M.S. (2007). Transparency and Corporate Governance, NBER Working Paper. 
14. Hettenhouse, G. and Sartoris, W. (1976). An Analysis of the Informational Value of Bond Rating Changes, 
Quarterly Review of Economics and Business, 16, pp. 65-78.  
15. Hite, G. and Warga, A. (1997). The Effect of Bond-Rating Changes on Bond Price Performance, Financial 
Analysts Journal, 53, pp. 35-51.  
16. Holthausen, R. and Leftwich, R.W. (1986). The Effect of Bond Rating Changes on Common Stock Prices, Journal 
of Financial Economics, 17, pp. 57-89.  
17. Hsueh, L.P., and Liu, Y.A. (1992). Market Anticipation and the Effect of Bond Rating Changes on Common Stock 
Prices, Journal of Business Research, 24, pp. 225-239.  
18. Jorion, P., Liu, Z., and Shi, C. (2005). Informational Effects of Regulation FD: Evidence from Rating Agencies, 
Journal of Financial Economics, 76, pp. 309-330.  
19. Kaplan, R. and G. Urwitz (1977). Statistical Models of Bond Ratings: A Methodological Inquiry, Journal of 
Business, 52, pp. 231-261. 
20. Katz, S. (1974). The Price and Adjustment Process of Bonds to Rating Reclassifications: A Test of Bond Market 
Efficiency, The Journal of Finance, 29, pp. 551-559. 
21. Kliger D. and Sarig O. (2000). The Information Value of Bond Ratings, Journal of Finance, 55, pp. 2879-2902. 
22. Kothari, S.P., Shu, S., and Wysocki, P.D. (2008). Do Managers Withhold Bad News? Journal of Accounting 
Research, 47, pp. 241-276.  
23. Micu, M., Remolona, E., and Wooldridge, P. (2004). The Price Impact of Rating Announcements: Evidence from 
the Credit Default Swap Market. BIS Quarterly Revie, June 2004, pp. 55-65. 
24. Moody’s Investors Service (1998). An historical Analysis of Moody’s Watchlist. 
25. Moody’s Investors Service (2002). Understanding Moody’s Corporate Bond Ratings and Rating Process.  
26. Pinches, G.E. and Singleton, J.C. (1978). The Adjustment of Stock Prices to Bond Ratings Changes, The Journal 
of Finance, 33, pp. 29-44.  
27. Sherwood, H.C. (1976). How Corporate and Municipal Debts Is Rated? John Wiley and Sons. 
28. Steiner, M., and Heinke, V.G. (2001). Event Study Concerning International Bond Price Effects of Credit Rating 
Actions, International Journal of Finance and Economics, 6, pp. 139-157.  
29. Verrecchia, R.E. (2001). Essays on Disclosure, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 32, pp. 97-180. 
30. Weinstein, M. (1977). The Effect of Bond Rating Change Announcement on Bond Prices, Journal of Financial 
Economics, 5, pp. 329-350. 
